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Abstract	
Populist argumentation claims to represent ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’, appealing to 
emotions and reacting to a sense of crisis. By analysing a public debate in Finland, in which 
populist arguments appropriate a culturally shared, familiar experience – that of singing 
Suvivirsi, the Summer Hymn – I argue that evoking familiarity is an effective way of ‘doing 
populism’. Analysing media texts from 2002 to 2014 and a questionnaire to political 
candidates in 2011 – when the right-wing populist (True) Finns Party broke through – 
using Laurent Thévenot’s sociology of engagements, I show that appeals to the familiarity 
of the hymn are particularly compatible with the populist valorization of the experience of 
the common people. In other words, familiarity is a central tool in the toolkit of populism. 
Remembering the shared experience of singing the hymn bonds the assumed ‘people’ 
together and gives an emotional charge for populist arguments. The article applies 
pragmatist political sociology, studying politics ‘in action’ in everyday disputes, to the 
analysis of populism – largely absent from previous, extensive, populism studies. 
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Introduction	
Our summer is arriving and gentle winds will blow 
We see our world reviving as grass and bushes grow 
For Heaven always brings us 
Both sun and soothing rain 
Eternal hymns it sings us 
And all is born again. 
(First verse of Suvivirsi, translated by Helsingius, 2000.) 
Suvivirsi (Summer Hymn), which pupils in Finnish schools traditionally sing in spring 
graduation ceremonies, has become a site of political struggle in 2000s Finland. Some 
question whether Christian hymns are appropriate in public schools, while others defend 
the cultural tradition. Others still emphasize its Finnishness and defend it against a cultural 
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threat they claim is introduced by immigrants. Analysing this debate, I will show that 
populist argumentation can appropriate (take into use) the familiarity of cultural artefacts, 
such as this hymn, to effectively claim to represent ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’. This is 
because appealing to familiar experience, rather than more abstract political constructions 
such as values, is particularly compatible with the populist valorization of the common 
people. 
By arguing that familiarity is a central tool in the toolkit of populism (see Swidler, 1986) 
– at least in Finnish political discourse, and in all likelihood, other instances of populism – I 
contribute to the literature on right-wing populist argumentation and especially its noted 
emotional tendency (Berezin, 2001, 2002; Canovan, 1999; Demertzis, 2006, 2014). This use 
of familiarity aims to conflate a ‘community of feeling’ – in this case, those participating in 
the song – with a nationalist political identity (Berezin, 2001, 2002). Also, I demonstrate 
that Laurent Thévenot’s sociology of engagements (Thévenot, 2001, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 
2014) is a particularly useful theoretical framework for analysis of populism, since it 
distinguishes between justification and familiarity in a way that aptly describes nuances of 
populist argumentation. Thus, the article is an application of pragmatist political sociology 
to the analysis of populism – largely absent from previous, extensive, studies on populism. 
As empirical material, I use Finnish media texts from 2002 to 2014 and a questionnaire of 
political candidates’ opinions and justifications in 2011. Immigration was one of the key 
issues of the Finnish 2011 electoral campaign, and the right-wing populist (True) Finns 
Party (Perussuomalaiset)1 gained a landslide victory – a development echoing those in several 
European countries (e.g. Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Mudde, 2007; Moffitt, 2016; Wodak et 
al., 2013) – with a nationalistic campaign, in which asserting the significance of cultural 
traditions such as Suvivirsi played its part.  
Suvivirsi represents a valuable cultural symbol to some, while others see it as a religious 
practice. To many, it is a familiar practice enabling rememberance and tradition. For 
populist framing (Aslanidis, 2015), this shared familiarity of the song is vital. That 
familiarity can be used to anchor right-wing populist discourse in shared experience. I will 
argue that through its familiarity, Suvivirsi provides a vessel to connect political 
argumentation to a solid base of everyday practices, which produce experiences of 
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belonging, to bridge the gap between familiar experience and institutional politics. I will 
begin with a short introduction to the Suvivirsi debate. 
Suvivirsi,	the	Summer	Hymn	
Typically, Suvivirsi ends the ceremony held on the first Saturday of June in the school gym, 
after the handing out of report cards, marking the beginning of the summer holiday. The 
music teacher often plays the piano or even a pump organ, leading the song, while proud 
parents and teachers stand up and join their offspring and students in a sing-along. 
Curiously, with regards to the new-found nationalist usage of the song, the hymn is of 
Swedish origin. It was popularized in Finland after the great famine of 1695–1697 
(Lappalainen, 2012) and thanks God for the awakening of nature and a coming harvest in 
springtime. In agrarian Nordic societies, this was a significant yearly event. The hymn’s 
lyrics mention ‘growing crops in the valleys’ and ‘thy blessed gifts that the land and sea bear 
for us’. As a seasonal rite, it holds great significance for many Finns. If you ask a Finn, they 
will typically say ‘everyone’ in Finland knows it by heart – since ‘everyone’ has sung it every 
spring as schoolchildren. Parents are reintroduced to the tradition each spring. 
However, the definition of ‘everyone’ participating in this cultural ritual is not as 
unambiguous as would seem at face value. While the strong position of the Lutheran 
church has meant that Finnish traditions often are Christian in nature (Kallio, 2015), 
Suvivirsi has become controversial, as the country is becoming more and more 
multicultural and secular. The church and the public school system have been some of the 
strongest institutions in Finnish society, which explains the saliency of this debate. The 
school system is near-universal and a matter of national pride: more than 97% of children 
attend public schools (Statistics Finland, 2014), they are ranked by a majority of Finns as 
‘the most significant thing about Finland’s history’, and education is seen as an asset of the 
nation (Torsti, 2012: 99–101, 109). Membership in the Evangelical Lutheran Church was 
until recently also near-universal: as high as 95.0% in 1970, but has declined to 75.2% in 
2014 (Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, 2006, 2014) because of immigration and 
secularization. On the other hand, large-scale immigration to Finland started relatively late, 
in the early 1990s, and is likely to continue – public debates on multiculturalism, however, 
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are still in their infancy, and the debatable conception of a historically homogenous and 
united Finnish people is overemphasized in nationalist arguments (Lehtonen, 2009). 
The Suvivirsi debate has previously been interpreted from the viewpoint of discursive 
cultural-essentialist Othering of the out-group (Leppänen, 2002; also see Sakki and 
Pettersson, 2015; Wood and Finlay, 2008), and there is a literature on emotional collective 
narratives of shared history (e.g. Liu and Hilton, 2005; Mols and Jetten, 2014; Wodak and 
Forchtner, 2014). However, instead of the narrative of Suvivirsi and what it represents, I 
focus on the argumentative power resulting from the mere familiarity of singing it, and how 
populist argumentation can ‘tap into’ such everyday experiences, reaffirming its defence of 
the people in the process. Such populist argumentation has, in recent years, increasingly 
been brought to the fore by the (True) Finns Party, which I will introduce next. 
The	(True)	Finns	Party	and	populism	in	action	
The (True) Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset) shocked the Finnish electoral scene in the general 
election of 2011 by coming in third place, shattering the decades-long stability of the so-
called Big Three (Social Democrats, conservative National Coalition and agrarian Centre 
Party) alternating in power (Arter, 2010; Borg, 2012; Ylä-Anttila, 2014; Ylä-Anttila and 
Luhtakallio, 2017; Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila, 2015). It entered government with the 
Centre Party and the National Coalition in 2015. The party is self-avowedly ‘nationalist’, 
‘Christian-social’ and ‘populist’ (Finns Party 2011: 6). They define populism as a mode of 
democracy based on rule of the people as a nation instead of rule by ‘international elite 
bureucracy’ (Finns Party 2011: 7). While it has roots in the agrarian populist Finnish Rural 
Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP, 1959–1995), it has moved from a defence of the rural 
poor to a full-fledged right-wing populism, converging with Nordic parties from different 
(right-liberal or neo-fascist) roots – the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and 
the Progress Party of Norway (Jungar and Jupskås, 2014; Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila, 
2015). Rhetorically, the party often looks to find comfort in the past: nostalgically 
referencing a lost community where things were simpler, familiar and firmly rooted in the 
perceived organic national community (Arter, 2010; Pyykkönen, 2011; Ylä-Anttila, 2014). 
In its name and politics, the party exclaims the virtue of being ‘just an ordinary down-to-
earth Finn’ (see also Rapley, 1998). It is Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, socially 
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conservative, increasingly right-wing in its economics as well – altogether, a right-wing 
populist party (Arter, 2010; Jungar and Jupskås, 2014; Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila, 2015). 
However, while the rise of the (True) Finns is generally taken as the primary indicator of 
the rise of populism in Finland, populism surely is not something only ‘populist’ parties 
engage in. Moreover, the concept of ‘populism’ is notoriously debated. Is it an ideology, a 
strategy, a style, a rhetoric, a discourse, a logic, or something else (for an overview, see 
Aslanidis, 2015)? The fact that it is often used pejoratively in everyday talk does not help. 
However, as the (True) Finns Party are proudly ‘populist’, there should be no issue in 
addressing them as such. Moreover, in the definition struggle of populism, what matters is 
whether the concept is of analytical use. Paris Aslanidis (2015) has convincingly argued that 
it is indeed, if we conceptualize it as a discursive frame (see also e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; 
Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford 1988): an ‘anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign 
People’ (Aslanidis, 2015: 9). Populist framing posits a ‘pure’, sovereign people against a 
‘corrupt’ elite, and in the case of right-wing populism, often excludes certain Others from 
‘the people’ (see Sakki and Pettersson, 2015 for a comparison of Othering in Finnish and 
Swedish right-wing populist discourses). 
Thus, crucially, to be populist is to use populist framing, and populism is a matter of 
degree, not either/or. Some have even suggested populism to be measurable in quantity 
from party documents (see Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011)2. To be clear, in this view, there is 
no clear division between ‘populist’ and ‘non-populist’ political actors. The populist frame 
may be employed strategically (Aslanidis, 2015: 12–13) but actors also interpret their 
experience through it (Aslanidis, 2015: 12, also see Goffman, 1974). I do not label and 
study ‘a populist party’ or ‘populists’, but doing populism (see also Jansen, 2011), in which 
politicians and laymen may engage in when discussing and acting out politics, if and when 
they engage in a valorization of the ‘common people’ and a denigration of ‘corrupt elites’. 
This understanding of populism is based on social movement studies, which take a much 
broader view of ‘politics’ than a traditional political-scientific view of (party) politics, 
including everyday discussions and actions of politically engaged citizens. Further, it is 
based on pragmatist sociological theorizing, which focuses on observable action and habits, 
without making assumptions about the underlying motivations or ideological values of 
social actors (see e.g. Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, Joas and Knöbl, 2009: 500–528). 
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Populist argumentation has been noted to have a strong emotional component (Berezin, 
2001, 2002; Canovan, 1999; Demertzis, 2006, 2014) and to often follow from a sense of 
crisis (Aslanidis, 2015: 12, Taggart, 2004: 275). I will argue that one particularly salient way 
of doing populism – to react to a ‘crisis’ by making emotional anti-elitist appeals in the 
name of ‘the people’ – is to appeal to familiar experience politically. This is because using 
familiarity-based arguments in the public sphere, and thus implicitly demanding their 
acceptance and legitimacy, lends particular potency to populist argumentation. Laurent 
Thévenot’s sociology of engagements provides my theoretical framework for this analysis. 
Sociology	of	engagements	
Laurent Thévenot’s sociology of engagements starts with justification theory (Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 1999, 2006), which describes worlds of justification. These are conventionalized 
value-systems, which conceptualize what is considered worthy on different fields of social 
interaction – and by extension, which arguments are seen as legitimate in public discussion 
concerning those fields (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 364). For example, when buying 
and selling on markets, people implicitly agree that the worth of goods is measured by the 
market mechanism (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 372, 2006: 43–61, 193–203) – thus 
arguments based on market value are most legitimate, and appeals to other kinds of 
legitimacy, such as family ties, would be considered inappropriate nepotism. In contrast, in 
the world of domestic relations, traditional hierarchies such as family ties are what matters 
(Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 370, 2006: 90–98, 164–178). References to these shared 
valuation systems are used in disputes in everyday situations and political debates, 
whenever a crisis creates the imperative to justify (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999: 359–360) – 
the worlds are conventionalized ways to legitimize arguments (Thévenot, 2001: 71). In the 
case of Suvivirsi, the most central justificatory dispute is whether the hymn should be 
evaluated as a cultural tradition or religious practice. 
However, clearly, not all social action takes the form of settling disputes by appealing to 
higher common principles. Thévenot has added a ‘vertical’ (Thévenot, 2007: 418) 
dimension to justification theory, forming a sociology of engagements of different levels of 
engagements. Here, the regime of justification is conceptualized as one regime of engagement with 
the world – the other pertinent regime, for this article, being the regime of familiarity. When in 
familiar surroundings, people can act based on habit, without critical reflection on the 
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value-basis of their actions (as would be necessary for justification), while maintaining a 
feeling of ease (Thévenot, 2007: 416, 2011b: 14–16, 2014: 13–15, 19–28). Here, the 
underlying pragmatist philosophy is evident (see also Thévenot, 2001). Objects we engage 
with in the familiar regime, which can be material or cultural artefacts (see also e.g. Latour, 
2005), and which Thévenot calls common-places, are invested with a ‘strongly personal 
engagement’ and breed ‘confidence’ (Thévenot, 2011a: 49). They ‘are not merely symbols, 
or signs, because they are the vehicle for deeply personal attachments’ (Thévenot, 2014: 
20). Familiarity is perhaps best described ‘by the phrase: “inhabiting a home”’ (Thévenot, 
2001: 69). We have a personal relationship to our everyday material and cultural 
surroundings, we are used to them. Suvivirsi is a prime example of a common-place. 
Such familiar engagement using common-places can take the form of political action, even 
though it is ‘not taken into account in most approaches to politics’ (Thévenot, 2014: 
10). Common-places can even be ‘instrumental in support of authoritarian power’ 
(Thévenot, 2015: 98), since they are ‘by construction, rather foreign to strangers’ 
(Thévenot, 2015: 98) – while they form a strong bond between those who share them, they 
also exclude strangers. This, as well, is apparent in the Suvivirsi debate, and is what gives 
Suvivirsi its exclusionary power. In the Suvivirsi debate, two solutions to the crisis emerge: 
that of justification (appeals to shared values) and that of return to familiarity (appeals based 
on an experience shared by a community). The latter is more compatible with populism, 
because it constructs a people around the common-place and valorizes the felt experience 
of the people participating. This is the analytical dichotomy I will employ. First, however, I 
will present some examples of empirical research using the concept of familiarity. 
Empirical usage 
Empirical research on familiarity at work in politics includes studies on disputes over public 
urban space in Russia (Lonkila, 2011), workers union activists in Belgium (Charles, 2012), 
environmental conflicts in Italy (Centemeri, 2015), urban ecological activists in Denmark 
(Blok and Meilvagn, 2015) and city-planning controversy in Japan (Blok, 2015). Also, 
feminist scholars have noted that in care work, familiar engagements are crucial – not just 
the official, measurable requirements of work (Thévenot, 2011a: 58). The feminist slogan 
of ‘the personal is political’ thus connects to this concept of familiarity – both highlight the 
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importance of a personal level excluded from public, rationalized politics. This leads to one 
of two empirical examples I will briefly discuss. 
First, Anna Colin Lebedev (2012) studies the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, an NGO 
representing the relatives of soldiers in the Russian army. They complain about the 
mistreatment experienced by the soldiers, but in order for their appeals to appear legitimate 
before the Russian authorities, they need to be reformulated as human rights abuses. They 
have to be re-framed as breaches of generally agreed principles – justified – instead of 
presented as mothers’ personal worries, which would remain in the regime of familiarity. The 
Soldiers’ Mothers study legal texts and write official letters translating the mothers’ worries 
into the language of legal contestation. Particular emotional grievances are raised onto the 
level of public societal action, making them legitimate. In the Suvivirsi debate, the situation 
is quite opposite, as I will show: populist arguments demand that familiarity is accepted as a 
legitimate political argument as such. This is where familiarity-based arguments’ populist 
appeal culminates: they valorize felt experiences over the value-systems of establishment 
politics. 
Second, and importantly for the Suvivirsi case, Serguei Oushakine (2011) argues that songs 
‘act as acoustic and narrative containers capable of evoking or accommodating forms of 
collective sensibility’ (Oushakine, 2011: 249) – they can be common-places, in Thévenot’s 
(2014: 21–22) words. Oushakine vividly describes Russian patriotic concerts in which war 
songs are performed to honor veterans, with audiences standing up and joining the 
performers in song, in a ‘collective impulse affectively orchestrated by the song’ 
(Oushakine, 2011: 263). Such a ‘collective impulse’ is what discussants try to appropriate in 
the Suvivirsi debate. 
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Table 1. Theoretical framework (adapted from Thévenot, 2001: 76, Thévenot, 2014: 13). 
 What is ‘good’? How are material 
and cultural objects 
engaged with? 
How is this visible 
in empirical 
material? 
Regime of 
justification 
Conventionalized 
and generalized 
common goods: 
worlds of 
justification, which 
can be appealed to 
publicly 
Justifications can be 
tested against them 
Implicit or explicit 
references to 
common value-
systems: cultural or 
religious heritage 
Regime of 
familiarity 
Feeling of ease, 
comfort and ‘home’ 
in habituated action 
As intimate 
common-places, 
which make ease 
and comfort in 
familiarity possible 
References to the 
concrete experience 
of singing the hymn 
and the emotions it 
evokes 
Thus, to analyse the Suvivirsi dispute on the basis of Thévenot’s sociology of engagements 
(summarized in Table 1), I coded my material with the Atlas.TI software for qualitative 
analysis, looking for justifications for arguments based on value systems and separating them 
from arguments based on familiarity. For example, when a discussant argued that Suvivirsi 
should be sung because it has been done for decades, this argument was coded as justification based 
on the generally accepted value of cultural traditions. On the other hand, when discussants 
referred to the concrete situation or the experience of singing the song and the emotions it evokes, the 
argument was coded as based on familiarity. The line between worlds of justification and 
familiarity was often blurred and interpretation is not clear-cut. Still, they did emerge as 
distinct arguments, as I will show. 
Analyses of Finnish politics have identified it to emphasize the regime of justification, 
especially the worth of efficiency (Lonkila, 2011; Luhtakallio 2012; Ylä-Anttila, 2010), and 
private interests (Eranti, 2014, 2017). Thus, I hypothesize that when actors use the populist 
frame, which proclaims to bring the everyday grievances of ‘the ordinary people’ into 
politics, opposing elite bureaucracy, they will employ the regime of familiarity particularly 
often, and that there is a particular discursive connection between the populist frame and 
the regime of familiarity. I will show that this indeed is the case, by analysing media 
materials and a questionnaire for political candidates, materials which I will present next. 
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Materials	
Figure 1. Pieces in Helsingin Sanomat mentioning Suvivirsi 2001–2014, analysed years in 
dark grey. 
Helsingin Sanomat, the largest daily national newspaper, has been one of the main arenas 
of the Suvivirsi dispute, as it tends to be for political debate in Finland. A search for 
‘suvivir*’ in HS 2001–2014 returns 213 articles, editorials and opinion pieces, which fall 
roughly into two waves: 2002–2003, when the Religious Freedom Act was being revised, 
and 2010–2014, marked by an immigration debate and the rise of the (True) Finns Party. I 
selected these two waves, adding up to 139 pieces. This material gives an overview of the 
public debate on Suvivirsi. 
To include politicians, I analysed candidates’ responses to the Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 
Voting Advice Application (VAA) in the Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011, the event 
of the (True) Finns Party’s breakthrough. The web-based VAA gives voting suggestions 
based on a political questionnaire, but also creates a comprehensive dataset on 
argumentation of party candidates. The VAA is a popular way for candidates to 
communicate with voters. 1820 of 2315 total parliamentary candidates (78.6%) responded 
to the question: ‘Should Suvivirsi be sung at schools’ spring festivities?’ I analysed 
comments (N=358) from the four largest parties: the conservative National Coalition, the 
agrarian Centre Party, the Social Democrats and the right-wing populist (True) Finns Party. 
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This material shows how politicians ‘tap into’ the familiarity of Suvivirsi in their 
argumentation. First, however, let us turn to the media debate. 
The	public	debate	on	Suvivirsi	in	HS	
The hymn’s cultural significance is illustrated in HS by recurrent references to it. The 
ending of the school year is typically noted by a small news piece: ‘Suvivirsi will soon ring 
out in Finnish schools to mark the beginning of summer’ (News, 27 May 2002, quotes 
translated by author). An ice-hockey team that lost a tournament was ‘seen off to summer 
holidays by Suvivirsi’ (sung by fans of the opposing team, Sports, 24 Mar 2003). Even a 
new medical implant for the hearing-impaired is introduced by telling the story of second-
grader Tuulia, who, thanks to the implant, ‘can now join the others in singing Suvivirsi’ 
(News, 31 May 2003). 
However, on 30 May 2002, a reader, ‘grandmother’ by title, writes in the opinion section 
that she is ‘deeply concerned’ over the fact that some kindergartens had omitted Suvivirsi 
from their spring ceremonies ‘because there were a few Muslims amongst the children’. A 
few opinions agree with her in the following days. On 4 June, another reader, this time a 
teacher, references a column in Opettaja (Teacher) magazine on 31 May, which misinterprets 
a new draft for the Religious Freedom Act as banning Suvivirsi. The teacher is strongly 
opposed to this. Håkan Mattlin, administrative director of the Ministry of Education, 
quickly writes to correct, stating on 6 June 2002 that ‘Suvivirsi will not be silenced’. The 
proposed legislation only ensures that students may opt out of religious ceremonies. 
Between 2002 and 2014, there are no actual calls in HS to ban Suvivirsi, and there are 
repeated assurances by officials that it will indeed not be banned (Deputy Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, 2014; Constitutional Law Committee, 2002, 2014; Religious Freedom 
Committee, 2001; HS, 22 September 2003, 16 March 2006, 8 August 2013, 4 April 2014, 25 
April 2014, 26 April 2014; National Board of Education, 2006, 2014; Deputy Chancellor of 
Justice, 2014). Despite this, the bulk of the debate consists of angry arguments vehemently 
opposing a supposedly looming ban. In 2014, more than 3000 members of the public even 
attend a ‘Save the Suvivirsi’ event to sing the song on Töölöntori square in Helsinki (IS, 31 
May 2014). Mere rumours are immediately opposed: ‘I heard that an EU directive forbids 
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singing the fourth verse of Suvivirsi in schools, since it mentions Jesus!’ (Opinion, 10 
November 2002) 
Justification 
In total, I located 67 appeals to worlds of justification and 33 appeals to familiarity in the 
139 documents of the HS material on Suvivirsi. There were no notable differences between 
the timeframes of 2002–2003 and 2010–2014. The majority of the debate focused on 
whether Suvivirsi should be identified as belonging to the world of ‘culture’ or ‘religion’, 
and then justifying opinions by referring to the worth of Suvivirsi in that world. These 
multiple worlds were also recognized by discussants, such as this one, who asserts that 
Suvivirsi can be interpreted as a prayer, a cultural tradition or something else, critically 
distancing himself from the debate: 
One of the signs of spring is the debate over whether singing Suvivirsi in 
school festivities is religious practice. There is no one right answer to this 
question: to one Suvivirsi may be a prayer, to another a beautiful tradition 
and yet to another neither of these. There is no objectively right answer. 
(Opinion, 6 Apr 2014) 
Suvivirsi is often described in the material as ‘a part of our cultural heritage’ (Opinion, 29 
May 2014). This is a justification appealing to an assumed shared understanding that 
cultural traditions have worth. Even a church official defined the hymn as ‘part of Finnish 
culture’ (Opinion, 28 Mar 2014) and not constituting religious practice. Others noted that 
‘it’s a part of our national cultural heritage despite its religious background’ (Opinion, 15 
Apr 2014).  
Many discussants presented Finnish culture as the norm and immigrants as a homogeneous 
Other, who ‘should not be allowed to change our traditions’ (Opinion, 30 May 2002). They 
argued it is ‘insulting’ to ‘have to live with Muslims who despise our religion’ (quote from 
letter to Chancellor of Justice reported in HS, 25 Apr 2014). The abandonment of Suvivirsi 
was portrayed as symptomatic of a long-standing moral decline ‘insulting the values of the 
majority, trampling on women’s rights, silent acceptance of genital mutilation and honour 
violence’ (Opinion, 28 Feb 2011). Such argumentation often echoed a cultural essentialist 
view, which sees cultures as unchanging and distinct features of groups (e.g. Hopkins et al., 
1997). The ‘ethno-pluralist’ belief that these cultures should be preserved by preventing 
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them from mixing is typical of European right-wing populist argumentation (Betz and 
Johnson, 2004; Spektorowski, 2003; Taguieff, 1993; Wren, 2001). However, cultural 
essentialism can also be used to defend multiculturalism (which ‘emphasizes equality 
between and respect for the pluralism of cultures and group identities’, Verkuyten, 2007: 
280), as noted by Maykel Verkuyten (2003) and exemplified in this quote, in which the 
discussant states that ‘cultures’ should respect each other, but still clearly delineates 
between their distinct traditions: 
When the Lutheran mainstream culture celebrates Easter, for example, 
Muslim children should be asked to join. Reciprocity is important: this is why 
it should be appropriately noted in schools and kindergartens when Muslims 
in their turn celebrate Ramadan. (Opinion, 3 Jun 2002) 
Altogether, the justification based on cultural heritage constituted the primary tone of the 
debate. Others defined Suvivirsi as religious instead of cultural, and either defended or 
criticized it on those grounds. It was seen as ‘a sung prayer’ (interview of Deputy 
Chancellor of Justice, 4 Apr 2014) and ‘a Christian tradition’ (News, 28 Jun 2012). A 
bishop denied his children attendance in their school’s spring ceremony, because it did not 
include Suvivirsi (News story, 5 Jun 2012), and it was argued that ‘raising a child in a 
religious vacuum’ (Opinion, 28 Mar 2010) would be detrimental to their development. 
These arguments are based on the claim that religious tradition is an important shared 
value-system. 
Familiarity 
A newspaper is not the most conducive medium for emotional expressions of familiarity, 
and it is conventional to justify arguments by general principles. Nevertheless, discussants 
reminisced their experiences of singing Suvivirsi as schoolchildren, and noted how singing 
the song now arouses ‘feelings of nostalgia’ (Column, 11 May 2014). The singing of 
Suvivirsi was described as ‘beautiful and tender’ (Opinion, 1 Jun 2011), something ‘most 
Finns have experiences of’ (interview of Deputy Chancellor of Justice, 4 Apr 2014), even ‘a 
part of the shared experience of many generations’ (Opinion, 29 May 2014). The hymn 
contains ‘a powerful emotional charge’ (interview of Deputy Chancellor of Justice, 4 Apr 
2014) which can elicit even physical responses: it can ‘move’ you (News, 26 Dec 2015) and 
‘make you weep’ (News, 26 Dec 2015), cause ‘shivers’ (Column, 21 Jul 2013) and ‘make 
your heart pound’ (News, 3 Jun 2011). Such expressions do not appeal to a shared cultural 
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value-system but a shared familiar experience – crucial to claiming that this is what ‘the 
people’ feel, as also shown by the quotes above about ‘most Finns’ and the ‘shared 
experience of generations’. 
Politicians	appropriating	Suvivirsi	
 Centre Party (True) Finns 
Party 
National 
Coalition 
Social 
Democrats 
Appeals to 
worlds of 
justification 
63 44 52 40 
Appeals to 
familiarity 
7 24 13 11 
Table 2. Appeals to worlds of justification and familiarity in the VAA comments (N=358). 
I now turn to a medium that is less formal and filtered: an online Voting Advice 
Application (VAA) for political candidates. The cultural and religious justifications seen in 
the media debate were reflected here as well (with 199 appeals to worlds of justification), 
but familiarity was also salient (with 55 appeals) – particularly for (True) Finns Party 
candidates (with 24 appeals), as can be seen from Table 2. 
Justification 
Many candidates refer to the implicitly shared and understood worth of cultural traditions, 
e.g.: ‘It is an essential part of Finnish cultural heritage’ (65, M, Finns Party). Indeed, the 
most common justification again is that the hymn is ‘cultural heritage’ – implying a shared 
understanding that cultural heritage is valuable as such. Again, culture is often presented in 
an essentialist sense, as an unchanging and distinct feature of groups: ‘Schools can continue 
to carry Finnish traditions, but should also teach about other religious traditions’ (47, F, 
Social Democrat). Many candidates believe that ‘they’ will also respect the fact that ‘we’ 
hold on to our traditions: ‘National culture is important, and when carried out with poise, 
others will also respect our practices.’ (57, M, Centre Party) 
The religious content of the hymn is debated in the VAA as well. However, when 
candidates directly address voters, if they place Suvivirsi in the world of religious 
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justification and assume the reader to share the valuation of this world, they can use more 
overtly religious justifications than discussants in the newspaper opinion pages. Here, a 
religious justification is tightly intertwined with nationalism as well: ‘If you don’t have 
Home, Christ and Fatherland, what you have is room for Satan.’ (63, M, Finns Party) 
The threat to Suvivirsi was located in ‘Muslims’, ‘immigrants’, ‘foreigners’, ‘minorities’, 
‘other religions’, ‘other cultures’, ‘outsiders’, ‘other people’, ‘others’ or just ‘them’ – this was 
especially characteristic of (True) Finns Party comments. It has been previously noted that 
in their 2011 manifesto as well, the (True) Finns Party engaged in a discourse of ‘superior, 
self-evident and natural Finnishness’ built on its stark separation from Others (Pyykkönen, 
2011). In the following quote, the candidate discusses the value of cultural traditions in an 
aggressive ‘if you don’t like it here, move out’ fashion. Immigrants, equated here with 
refugees (‘I understand immigrants have come here to get help’) are accused of ‘trying to 
take over the country’ by supposedly forcing the Finnish majority to change their 
traditions. 
If our tradition is offensive to someone, he/she should move to a country 
which traditions don’t offend him/her. I understand immigrants have come 
here to get help. Why are they trying to take over the country. (58, F, Finns 
Party) 
Familiarity 
While text is not necessarily the most conducive medium for expression of emotion, if it 
can be done, perhaps with capital letters and multiple exclamation and question marks: 
If Finns have to look at the religious dress of muslims and the subordination 
of women under the guise of religion, so we can without worry sing Suvivirsi 
once a year! IS THIS QUESTION SOME SORT OF JOKE??? (53, F, Finns 
Party) 
In quotes like these, the issue of opposing immigration, and morally condemning the 
claimed cultural habits of Muslims, takes primary importance. However, the heartfelt 
emotional familiarity of the song is clearly powerful. The candidate quoted above seems to 
genuinely feel insulted by the potential ‘loss’ of the experience – it is not just about the song 
itself, but the continued practice of singing it ‘once a year’ – and for this candidate, this 
should count as an argument, without need for further justification. This proposition is so 
unfathomable to the candidate it can only be interpreted as ‘a joke’ – her experience should 
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render any need for justification unnecessary. A similar sentiment is echoed by many other 
candidates, for example: ‘Totally unbelievable that someone would even question this.’ (57, 
M, Finns Party)  
As the song represents something familiar, the candidates see the practice of their offspring 
continuing this tradition as a touching gesture of the succession of generations. The 
meaning of the song cannot be grasped by referring to its lyrical contents or even the 
generalized values of Christianity or Finnishness it is claimed to represent. Candidates talk 
about the habit, its familiarity, and the comfort this brings: ‘it feels familiar and expresses the 
coming of the spring’ (63, M, Social Democrat), or: ‘The best thing about the school spring 
ceremony was Suvivirsi’ (56, F, Social Democrat). Such claims do not adhere to the regime 
of justification, where reference to abstract common goods is made. Instead, the emotional 
experiences referenced by respondents indicate that the ‘good’ carried by the song is 
strongly attached to the very experience of singing it with others at a specific event 
(semester ending ceremony) held at a specific place (the school), a specific age (childhood) 
and a specific time of year (spring). They reminisce the sound of the pump organ and the 
smell of spring, visceral bodily experiences that cannot be conveyed by referring to 
principles of justification, only by appealing to the familiarity of the common-place – to 
those that share that familiarity – the ‘people’ of their populism. ‘I believe everyone knows it 
by heart’, as one candidate put it (47, M, Social Democrat, emphasis added). The emotional 
experience of this cultural habit is tied to the concrete situation, via personal attachment to 
a common-place, not just discursive descriptions of it. ‘Tapping into’ this experience is a 
politicization of the everyday experience of the ‘common people’, not in need of 
justification. It is non-negotiable, quite literally: political debate or deliberation about it is 
impossible. One respondent simply typed: ‘Give me a break!!’ (45, M, Finns Party), while 
another noted ‘That’s it.’ (58, F, Finns Party) 
When talking about their familiar attachments, in contrast to the justification of the value-
system of ‘national traditions’, the respondents make reference to the personal experience 
of hearing the song ‘echoed in Finnish schools, filling hearts with emotion when nature 
blooms’ (65, M, Finns Party). The remembrance of once singing the song as pupils 
themselves, to mark the beginning of summer, overwhelms them with emotion even today. 
The implication is that one cannot truly understand the significance and meaning of the 
song unless one has heard it and participated in the springtime ritual. The common-place is 
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similar to Paul Taggart’s (2004) notion of the ‘heartland’ as a central concept for populists: 
it ‘represents an idealized conception of the community they serve’, and ‘heartlands are 
something that is felt rather than reasoned’ (Taggart, 2004: 274) – they are familiar: 
Suvivirsi draws thoughts to summer even if school days were a long time ago. 
(49, F, Finns Party) 
I don’t understand who’s offended by Suvivirsi? I’m not particularly religious 
myself and still I always wait for Suvivirsi to brings tears to eyes. (38, F, 
Social Democrat) 
It still brings tears to my eyes when I sing it. This I want to be continued and 
this feeling I hope will be passed to children. (42, F, National Coalition) 
Two respondents, both Finns Party candidates, even entered the first few lines of the song 
(‘Jo joutui armas aika...’) as their comment on the issue, as if they were singing it behind their 
keyboards, highlighting the ability of this experience to tie together those and only those 
who have participated in it (Berezin, 2001, 2002; Oushakine, 2011; Thévenot, 2011b: 18). 
This shared common ground brings with it a feeling of security, of being tied to one’s 
familiar surroundings (Thévenot, 2011b: 8). This brings us to my concluding discussion. 
Discussion	
As noted, one of the most common observations about populism is that it is ‘a reaction to 
a sense of extreme crisis’ (Taggart, 2004: 275, see also Aslanidis, 2015: 12). The populist 
reaction can be interpreted as an attempt to avoid the imperative for justification created by 
such a crisis. Instead, populism turns back to the heartlands and common-places of pre-
justification familiarity – in this case, the supposed homogeneous national community 
‘before multiculturalism’ – to fix the crisis by returning to times before it happened, before 
habits had to be justified, when one could navigate worldly complexities based on 
familiarity, ‘sing the song as it has always been sung’, instead of engaging in a public debate 
over plural orders of worth. By writing comments based on personal familiar experience, 
the analysed discussants demand the acceptance of their experience as ‘common people’ in 
the sphere of politics, without need for justification by value-systems, let alone politicians, 
bureaucrats, or other authorities. 
Coming back to Berezin’s (2001) argument that ‘political identities are […] distant from the 
concerns of “ordinary life” […] Political identities are public identities. They frequently 
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take second place to more deeply felt private identities’, we can argue that this is the gap 
that populist appeals to familiarity attempt to bridge: they aim to conflate the community of 
feeling, those who feel the familiarity, with a nationalist political identity (Berezin, 2001, 2002). 
Indeed, according to Berezin, the most effective political usage of communities of feeling is 
to appropriate existing ones, as when British Prime Minister Tony Blair labelled Princess 
Diana as the ‘People’s Princess’ at time of her death – ‘to infuse his Labour Party with 
Diana’s charisma’ (Berezin, 2002: 40). Similarly, in the case at hand, populist arguments 
appropriate the familiarity of Suvivirsi and claim that it is threatened by immigrants – to 
infuse exclusionary nationalist demands with the feeling of familiarity, and exclude from 
‘the people’ those who do not share the feeling. While Suvivirsi is not nationalist as a song, 
and neither is the school spring ceremony explicitly formulated to foster national belonging, 
the ritual creates a community of feeling, a shared experience bonding its participants 
together. By giving this shared emotional experience a nationalist meaning, the ‘deeply felt 
private identity’ (Berezin, 2001), arising from belonging in the community that sings the 
song, is conflated with a political, public identity. 
Thévenot (2014: 10) argues that the regime of familiar engagements ‘is not taken into 
account in most approaches to politics and participation in public spaces or arenas’. 
Similarly, Lonkila (2011: 31) states that the typical Finnish expectation, of requiring all 
political arguments to operate on a publicly justified level of generality, has led to 
neglecting some research questions and themes. Clearly, politicization that appeals to 
familiarity as an argument in itself requires analysis on that level, not merely on the level of 
abstract values and ideologies. 
However, contrary to a Laclauian conception of populism (e.g. Laclau, 2005a, 2005b) 
focusing on ‘empty’ and ‘floating signifiers’, with no particular content, which are imbued 
with suitable meanings for the particular demand at hand; my analysis of the situatedness of 
populist symbols in a concrete familiar experience points out that these signifiers are 
sometimes not ‘floating’ or ‘empty’ – on the contrary, in this case, they are strongly 
connected to spatial, physical, concrete and familiar experiences which enable them to carry 
a strong weight and emotional power to be harnessed in populist argumentation, 
constructing a people against perceived threats. These arguments would not have such 
impact without the familiarity of Suvivirsi, and Suvivirsi could not be harnessed as easily to 
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a non-populist cause because of the inherent connection of the ritual to a construction of 
‘the people’. 
In this paper, I have analysed the political appropriation of familiar experiences by populist 
arguments. Such politics emphasizes personal familiarity felt by ‘the people’ towards 
particular common-places. Examples of this were found in political candidates’ and citizens 
comments in a public debate, in their appeals to the familiarity of Suvivirsi. The appeals 
hinge on a shared common-place, the school spring semester ending ceremony and the 
shared experience of singing the hymn as a schoolchild. In understanding right-wing 
populist argumentation, this should be taken into account: it is quite different to argue the 
importance of national traditions as a generalized value than it is to appeal to a familiar 
experience of singing a traditional hymn. In the latter case, inclusion in the group, the 
members of which share the familiarity of this experience, is nigh on impossible to achieve 
for ‘outsiders’. This is a populist and exclusionary politicization of the familiar experience 
of ‘the common people’, to which ‘everyone’ participating in the debate is falsely assumed 
to belong. 
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Notes
1 The first part of the party name, perus, refers to a fundamental ordinariness, with the latter 
part suomalaiset meaning Finns. They previously used the translation True Finns but 
adopted the official English name The Finns in August 2011, after receiving international 
media attention (HS, 21 Aug 2011). 
                                                
 20 
                                                                                                                                          
2 Rooduijn and Pauwels’ approach is very compatible with the one taken here, since they 
measure populism in party discourse, that is, observable populism ‘in action’ in politics. 
This is clearly distinct from Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove’s (2014) approach of 
measuring populist attitudes in voters, that is, as an assumed attribute of individuals, which 
is not in the focus of this paper. 
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